This paper investigates equity market reactions to the regulation of executive compensation. We exploit a natural experimental setting in the German environment, where recent legislation introduces restrictions on the amount and on the components of board executive compensation packages, and invokes liability for the supervisory board in case of inappropriate remuneration arrangements. We use this exogenous shock to the contracting environment to infer market perceptions of usefulness of the regulation. Using event study methodology, we investigate market reactions for the first-time announcement of regulatory intent and for a pooled sample of seven events leading to the adoption of the law act. We find weak evidence of an average negative market reaction to the proposed regulation. Multivariate analyses reveal that these firms which were particularly affected by the regulation due to high abnormal remuneration or low pay sensitivity experienced negative stock price reactions. Taken together, these findings indicate that the regulation was not perceived as beneficial from a shareholder perspective. This result is consistent with the market perceiving the regulation of executive compensation to impose potentially inefficient contractual arrangements for some firms.
Introduction
This paper investigates market reactions to the regulation of executive compensation in Germany.
In an immediate reaction to the financial crisis and the perceived catalyzing role of compensation contracts geared towards short-term performance, the German legislator in June 2009 adopted the "Vorstandsvergütungsangemessenheitsgesetz" (VorstAG). This 'Appropriate Director
Compensation Act' stipulates an unprecedented interference with private compensation schemes.
While extant company law broadly required the supervisory board to set an 'appropriate' remuneration for members of the executive board, the VorstAG mandates that compensation be (1) 'customary', (2) reflect management performance (pay for performance), and (3) be tied to longterm performance measures. In addition, the VorstAG includes an array of specific provisions on executive compensation, and the non-binding advisory vote of shareholders on board compensation ('say on pay'). Also, it invokes liability for supervisory board members should they set inappropriate compensation. Taken together, this legal initiative substantially altered the regulatory environment in Germany and impacted heavily on the shape of compensation contracts (Götz and Friese, 2012) .
Adoption of the VorstAG represented an exogenous shock to the contracting environment and therefore creates a natural experimental setting that allows us to shed light on the economic effects of a regulatory intervention with compensation arrangements. An exhaustive branch of literature addresses how compensation contracts evolve, providing two competing explanations. The 'efficient contracting' hypothesis asserts that observable contracts, on average, are effective in setting incentives for managers to act in the interest of capital providers (e.g., Bertrand, 2009 ). In contrast, authors such as Bebchuk and Fried (2003) conjecture that managers have incentives to install mechanisms of 'entrenchment' to avoid control by their principals, and to negotiate inefficient contracts that benefit managers at the expense of shareholders ("pay without performance"). Our objective is to infer to what extent market participants regarded the recent regulation as beneficial, by forcing more firms towards efficient contracts that resolve shareholdermanager-conflicts.
We identify seven events on the way to the adoption of the VorstAG, which presumably significantly altered market expectations with respect to the likelihood or the scope and content of the regulation of executive compensation. For a sample of firms listed on the German stock market, we investigate the perceived economic effects of the regulation by observing market adjusted returns around the event dates. Our pooled analyses provide weak evidence that the market on average reacted negatively to the regulation. In a second set of analyses, we shed more light on these effects by regressing market adjusted returns on firm-level characteristics that indicate which firms were likely to be affected by the regulation. For one thing, we hypothesize that firms with high abnormal, i.e., above industry average compensation arrangements in particular fall under the provision of the VorstAG to award no more than 'customary' remuneration. Second, as the VorstAG emphasizes the mandate to set performance-based compensation, we conjecture that firms with low pay-performance sensitivity are also affected.
To lend robustness to our findings and to ensure proper identification of effects induced by the pending regulation, we perform two sets of multivariate analyses. First, we estimate our regressions for the first-time announcement of the then ruling coalition to regulate executive compensation, as this event represents the exogenous shock which significantly increased the likelihood of regulation. Our second set of regressions is estimated for a pooled sample of all seven events, from the first-time announcement to the final adoption of the VorstAG by the German parliament.
For both variables, abnormal pay and low pay sensitivity, we document a significant negative relation with market value, which indicates that those firms which were most affected by the regulation suffered market value losses. These results hold both for the single-event analysis and for the pooled sample regressions, and are significant using (1) conventional t-statistics and (2) pvalues obtained from Monte-Carlo Simulation. These findings suggest that market participants regarded the regulation as value-decreasing in particular for firms with highly paid executives, and firms with low-powered incentives. Such a result is consistent with shareholders expecting the VorstAG to impair efficient contracting for these firms.
Our findings are similar to , who investigate regulation of executive compensation in the U.S., and document negative market reactions for firms with excess CEO compensation. However, our paper augments this prior evidence and makes several incremental contributions. First, our results are more robust, as we are able to triangulate our findings using single-event and pooled-event analysis. Second, exploiting a rich hand-collected dataset, we are able to demonstrate that our findings extend to an alternative contractual measure, pay performance insensitivity, and that results prevail both for the CEO and for average members of the executive board. Third, by using a finer partition of our abnormal or excess compensation measure, we are able to demonstrate that negative market value reactions occur for presumably 'overpaid' managers only, but not for managers with below-average compensation.
Finally, and most importantly, we demonstrate that the results translate to an institutional environment with particularly different features. In the German two-tier system, an independent supervisory board sets management compensation, with the objective of enacting not only shareholders' interests, but also to recognize other stakeholders such as creditors or employees, as reflected by the system of co-determination (e.g., Haar, 2012) . Supervisory boards are required to enact such a stakeholder model, and to ensure the long-term existence of the firm.
Also, traditionally, financial institutions have been influential in shaping board matters. Larcker and Tayan (2011: pp. 44 ) therefore conjecture that regular shareholders have less influence on board matters in Germany as e.g., in the U.S. If accordingly, existing contracts in the German setting are on average less efficient from a shareholder perspective, then the VorstAG might very well have a beneficial effect. Put differently, it is an open empirical question whether existing contracts represent efficient outcomes from a shareholder perspective, and to which extent recent regulation has an impact on shareholder wealth. Despite these differences in the German governance model (Goergen et al., 2008) , we are unable to demonstrate beneficial effects of regulating executive compensation from an equity market perspective. This suggests that at least from a shareholder perspective, there is no evidence in support of executive compensation regulation, be it in a shareholder-based economy, or a stakeholder-oriented system.
Taken together, our findings are in line with concerns regarding the usefulness of interfering with private contracting in the area of management compensation. It is up to future research to demonstrate whether there are areas of corporate governance where regulatory interference with private contracting potentially generates welfare. Therefore, the results of our paper should be of interest to national and supranational regulators, in the particular with the European Union, and to researchers in the field of executive compensation and corporate governance.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section two elaborates on the regulatory background. Section three discusses prior literature and develops our hypotheses. In section four the methodology is outlined. Section five presents and discusses the empirical findings. Our final section six concludes.
Background: Regulation of executive compensation in Germany
In the wake of corporate scandals and increased awareness of the role and importance of governance mechanisms, various aspects of corporate governance, including disclosure and setting of board compensation, have been subject to hard-law regulation in Germany during recent years. angemessenheitsgesetz' (VorstAG)), effective since August 2009, directly affects how executive compensation is set. As our paper investigates market reactions to critical events leading to the adoption of the VorstAG, the remainder of the section details the state of compensation regulation prior to the VorstAG, and the changes introduced with this new legislation.
Under the German two-tier system, the executive board of a public company is charged with developing and implementing the firm's strategy and managing day-to-day business. Members of the executive board are nominated by the supervisory board. The supervisory board oversees and controls the executive board (Larcker and Tayan, 2011: pp. 44-46; Hopt, 2011) . One of the more specific tasks of the supervisory board is to negotiate compensation contracts with members of the executive board. Prior to the VorstAG, par. 87 of the securities act merely required the supervisory board to set 'appropriate' compensation. As 'appropriateness' was never detailed by the lawmakers or the courts, this requirement effectively had no restraining influence on the setting of compensation contracts, which essentially followed a business judgment rule (Haar, 2011) .
Complementary to this virtually ineffective hard law provision, the German Corporate Governance
Code since 2002 laid down more detailed soft law requirements. However, in practice, a substantial portion of firms chose not to comply with these principles (von Werder and Talaulicar, 2009) , and even when they stated they did, practices varied substantially, given the rather general tone of the Code's requirements (von Werder, 2011 The legislator's basis for conclusions to the law act and pertinent clarifications from law scholars shed light on the meaning of these criteria. Accordingly, a 'customary' compensation is one that is of a comparable nature with respect to managers that hold similar positions with other firms. Comparability may also relate to the ratio of board compensation to regular employees' compensation. However, currently, there is no consensus on how high such a ratio should be.
Therefore, comparability refers in particular to peer firms' average executive compensation, which means that industry standards play an important role in setting the size and structure of executive compensation. The second criterion requires a substantial fraction of the compensation to be tied to managerial performance. While this requirement for executive compensation to be 'performancebased' can be expected to generally increase the proportion of variable remuneration components, the third criterion emphasizes in particular the use of long-term performance targets to that end (Proceedings of the German Parliament 16/13433). Any performance-linked compensation is additionally subjected to the requirement for the supervisory board to include caps that prevent excessive payments in case of an 'extraordinary development'. The legislator emphasizes the intent to substantially alter compensation practices by also introducing a liability clause for members of the supervisory board for setting 'inappropriate compensation'. Also, the supervisory board is now explicitly required to reduce compensation, i.e., to interfere with existing contracts, in cases of financial / economic distress.
The VorstAG also introduced a set of specific provisions and rules. For one thing, the new legislation prescribes minimum personal liability of executive board members under D&O insurance of up to one and a half times the fixed portion of annual salary. Also, the minimum vesting time for stock options granted is increased from two years to four years. Second, in contrast to the extant practice of deferring issues of executive pay to a compensation sub-committee of the supervisory board, contracts now must be approved by the whole supervisory board, which under the German system of co-determination also includes employee and trade union representatives.
Finally, the VorstAG adopts an optional advisory vote on the 'compensation system' for the annual shareholders' meeting of listed corporations, the so-called 'say on pay'.
Taken together, the VorstAG introduces criteria and restrictions for executive compensation that were absent in the German system prior to the regulation, accompanied by increasing liability for supervisory board members to set legally correct contracts. The regulation and its pertinent documentation reflect the legislator's determination to substantially alter compensation practices.
This expectation is confirmed by early evidence on the implications of the VorstAG. 3 Götz and Friese (2010 , 2011 (Götz and Friese, 2010, p. 416; Götz and Friese, 2012, p. 418) .
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Firms disclose in their annual reports how they implemented the VorstAG. For example, in the 2009 annual report of Volkswagen, a German car manufacturer, it is outlined that "the remuneration structure is focused on ensuring sustainable business growth in accordance with the [VorstAG]" (p. 112). In addition to fixed compensation and a business performance-based bonus, Volkswagen implemented the VorstAG by adopting a new long-term incentive program starting in 2010, the so-called 'Strategy 2018'. Under this program, long-term performance-related compensation of executive board members is based on the four-year average of four criteria, a customer satisfaction index, an employee index (including employment rate, productivity, and employee satisfaction), sales growth, and increase in return on sales (p. 113).
Hypotheses development
The objective of this paper is to exploit the experimental VorstAG setting to investigate whether this regulation of executive compensation created value for shareholders. The equity value impact is measured by stock market reactions to the (expected) regulation. On a semi-strong form efficient market, investors instantaneously and correctly factor such publicly available information into prices. Therefore, stock prices reflect the market's joint perception of the likelihood of the regulation, and of its economic effects. An increased likelihood of regulation c.p. accentuates impacts on firm value (Schwert, 1981) .
Regulatory interference with private contracting potentially creates value if contractual outcomes in equilibrium are inefficient. Therefore, the equity market value effect of the regulation is related to the unobservable efficiency of board compensation contracts. A rich literature examines determinants of executive compensation in the context of efficient contracting. Broadly, this literature proposes two non-exclusive explanations for various aspects of compensation contract design, and provides evidence for both (see reviews e.g., by Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Bertrand, 2009) . Under the efficient contracting approach, existing contractual arrangements are regarded as an efficient solution to mitigating agency problems that result as shareholders entrust managers with managing their firms. Observable contractual features such as bonuses tied to firm performance, or stock option plans, and the time-series and cross-sectional variation therein, can be reconciled with the notion of principal agent theory that compensation contracts should align managers' interests with the owner objective of shareholder value maximization (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . In contrast, the managerial power or rent extraction view proposes that observable contracts do not represent efficient contractual outcomes, but serve as vehicles for powerful managers to extract inappropriate compensation. Under this view, "executive compensation is viewed not only as a potential instrument for addressing the agency problem but also as a part of the agency problem itself" (Bebchuk and Fried, 2003, p. 72) . The key assumption here is that executives are not efficiently governed, e.g., due to busy or captured boards of directors. Such inefficient controls enable managers to extract rents via means such as excessive perquisites, option backdating, strategic use of compensation consultants, or ineffective stock option grants not sufficiently tied to managerial performance.
Compensation contracts are both a part and a product of firm-level corporate governance choices. In equilibrium, compensation contracts, to varying degrees, can be reconciled with both the efficient contracting and the managerial power hypothesis. However, given the firm-level endogeneity of governance choices, the degree of cross-sectional efficiency of compensation contracts is not observable. Exogenous shocks to the governance system, which shake up existing contractual arrangements, therefore potentially yield revealing insights Frydman and Jenter, 2010) . We exploit such a shock, the regulation of executive pay and supervisory board liability in Germany, to glean insights into the market perception of the economic effects of the regulation. The underlying premise is that any regulation receives vindication only if it can be expected to increase welfare. 4 In line with a positive case for regulation from a shareholder perspective, we state our first hypothesis:
H1: On average, firm value increases with the increased likelihood or scope / content of regulation of executive compensation.
Given the hitherto virtually unregulated nature of compensation arrangements in Germany, existing contracts show substantial heterogeneity. Accordingly, we expect firms to be affected by the regulation to different degrees, which should be mirrored by market value reactions. Therefore, in a second step, we investigate the relation between observable contractual features and market value reactions. We identify two observable features that are potentially affected by the VorstAG regulation, excess compensation, and pay insensitivity. As noted in section 2, the provisions of the VorstAG for one thing mandate total compensation not to exceed the 'customary' level, i.e., the industry average. Therefore, firms with above-industry average compensation levels are particularly affected by the regulation. If this regulation is greeted by shareholders, we predict:
H2: Market value reactions to the increased likelihood or scope / content of regulation of executive compensation are positively associated with the degree of 'abnormal'
compensation.
In addition to putting a ceiling to the total amount of compensation, the VorstAG also mandates compensation to be tied to (long-term) performance. Therefore, we expect firms to be particularly affected when they make little use of performance-based pay so far, i.e., they have contracts in place with high pay-performance insensitivity. Accordingly, we state:
H3: Market value reactions to the increased likelihood or scope / content of regulation of executive compensation are positively associated with the degree of pay-performance insensitivity.
While the concept of investigating market reactions to measure economic impacts of regulation is well-established, starting with Schwert (1981) , this paper is most closely related to the study by . 5 These authors, among other things, investigate for a U.S. setting market reactions to eight events which increased the likelihood of regulation of executive compensation that would limit compensation or introduce shareholders' non-binding vote on compensation ('say on pay'). While obtain no meaningful results for the respective event dates, pooled analyses over all these eight events yield a negative significant association between excess CEO pay and abnormal event-day returns. The authors interpret this finding in the light of the efficient contracting hypothesis as an indication of a negative regulatory impact. As noted in the introduction, our paper differs to along several dimensions. First, with respect to the analyses, we exploit a hand-collected dataset to investigate a second observable compensation feature, the sensitivity of board members' pay to performance, and conduct our analyses both for average board compensation and, as a robustness check, for CEO compensation. Second, and more importantly, we investigate a setting which differs markedly from the U.S. in terms of governance regulation and governance practices. In particular, in the German system, governance mechanisms need to reconcile the different objectives of various stakeholders, such as shareholders, creditors, and employees. This is reflected in the stated objective of governance regulation to ensure the long-term existence of the firm, and bears down, e.g., on the composition of the supervisory board, where so-called co-determination legally ensures representation of employees and their representatives (e.g., trade unions) (Haar, 2012) . The efficiency of existing compensation contracts from a shareholder perspective is therefore an open empirical question, and so is the impact of regulation of executive compensation on equity market values.
Methodology

Event study design
To address our hypotheses, we measure market adjusted returns around seven events that significantly altered the probability or the scope and content of the regulation. In line with related prior literature (Joos and Leung, 2013; Cai and Walkling, 2011; Armstrong et al., 2010) , we choose a three-day window around the respective events. Market reactions are measured using market adjusted returns (MAR), which we calculate as the difference between three-day raw returns for the respective firm, and three-day market returns. As our benchmark market index, we choose the FTSE World Europe excluding Germany, to exclude firms that are affected by the regulation, and therefore avoid underestimating the effect of the regulation (Zhang, 2007) .
To address our first hypothesis, we measure the mean market reactions for each of our seven event dates leading to adoption of the VorstAG (see section 4.4), and for a pooled sample of these events. We apply three different test statistics to assess the significance of market reactions (Armstrong et al., 2010) . First, using traditional test statistics, we test whether market adjusted returns on the event(s) are significantly different from zero. The underlying assumption of traditional test statistics is that absent regulatory action market-adjusted returns on average are zero.
Thus, if market adjusted returns are not zero absent regulatory measures, documented market reactions would result from misspecification. To address this concern, results in the absence of regulatory action are simulated using Monte-Carlo Simulation. The two additional test statistics from Monte-Carlo Simulation employ mean market adjusted returns from 53 non-overlapping three-day non-event windows during the period from our first to our last event. We randomly select (one / seven) non-overlapping three-day non-event windows and calculate the mean market adjusted return over these non-events. We follow, e.g., Armstrong et al. (2010) and Zhang (2007) , and repeat this procedure 1,000 times to simulate the distribution of mean market adjusted returns over randomly selected non-event windows. For the second test statistic, we test whether the mean market adjusted returns over the pooled events are significantly different from the distribution of the simulated mean market adjusted returns. For the third test statistic, we calculate the weighted bootstrap p-value, which is the percentage of simulated mean market adjusted returns over seven non-events that are higher (in case of overall positive mean market adjusted returns) or lower (in case of overall negative mean market adjusted returns) than the pooled mean market adjusted returns for our event(s).
Determinants model
To test our hypotheses 2 and 3, we estimate the following model using OLS-regressions:
MAR is the market adjusted return, calculated as described in section 4. Our vector of control variables includes a measure of ownership concentration (FREE FLOAT). A large literature documents that effective ownership control, in particular concentrated ownership, is positively related to the efficiency of compensation arrangements in place (e.g., Elston and Goldberg, 2003; Harvey and Shrieves, 2001; Fahlenbrach, 2009 ). According to Shleifer and Vishny (1997, p.754) , large shareholders have incentives to monitor the management and sufficient control rights to put pressure on the management. Consistent with this, Mehran (1995) finds that ownership concentration by outside investors might be a substitute for incentive pay.
Also, we control for various factors that prior literature has demonstrated to explain market adjusted returns or abnormal returns, namely the natural logarithm of market capitalization (SIZE), the market-to-book ratio (MTB). Consistent with Ferri and Maber (2013) , we also include the market adjusted return over the prior six months (MOMENTUM). Furthermore, we use a binary variable that captures whether the respective firm participates in the DAX, the German blue chip index (DAX). DAX indicates the effect of the regulation for large firms with high visibility, which are likely to face particular public scrutiny and political pressure, which potentially accentuates market outcomes. Finally, we include industry controls (e.g., Cai and Walkling, 2011; Zhang, 2007) .
We follow established methodology for analyzing market reactions to regulation and estimate our determinants model both for our key event, the first-time announcement of the regulation (e.g., Cai and Walkling, 2011) , and for a pooled sample encompassing all seven events that presumably altered the likelihood or scope and content of the regulation (e.g., Joos and Leung, 2013; Armstrong et al., 2010) . 6 This pooled analysis enables us to capture effects that, although small on the individual event level, occur on multiple events . Consequently, we obtain multiple observations both for the respective event dates and for the firms in our sample.
As regulatory measures affect all firms on the same date, returns are likely to be cross-sectionally correlated (e.g., MacKinlay, 1997) which might lead to biased standard errors (Gow et. al, 2010; Petersen, 2009) . To address the correlation of market adjusted returns in the multi-event analysis, we follow the recommendation by Gow et al. (2010) and use bootstrapped standard errors clustered by event (Cameron et al., 2008) .
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As for our univariate analyses, we assess significance of our findings using traditional tstatistics, and two additional test statistics from a Monte-Carlo Simulation using non-overlapping non-event windows to address potential misspecification, i.e., market-adjusted returns being correlated with variables of interest absent regulatory action (e.g., . We simulate the distribution of the coefficients on our variables of interest and control variables based on randomly selected non-event windows. For the single-event (pooled event) analysis, we estimate our regression for one (seven) randomly selected non-event window(s), 8 and repeat this procedure 1,000 times to generate the non-event distribution of our coefficients (Cai and Walkling, 2011; Zhang, 2007) . For the second test, we establish whether the coefficient estimates based on the event-date regression differ from the simulated coefficient estimates obtained using non-event date 6 For events that decrease the likelihood / scope of the regulation, MAR is multiplied by negative one. Joos and Leung (2013) and also cluster standard errors at the event date to deal with the correlation of market adjusted returns in the multi-event analysis. Because we do not have a sufficient number of clusters (e.g., Gow et al., 2010; Petersen, 2009) , we bootstrap the clustered standard errors (Cameron et al., 2008; Gow et al., 2010) . Results remain unchanged when using bootstrapped standard errors clustered by event and firm.
returns. 9 For the third test statistic, we calculate bootstrap p-values for coefficients on our variables of interest and control variables based on the simulated coefficient estimates.
Variables measurement
ABNORMAL PAY is defined as the two-year average of the residuals from estimating the following regression (Cai and Walkling, 2011): 10 AVERAGE PAY it = β 0 + β 1 SIZE it + β 2 ROA it + β 3 STOCK RETURN it + β 4 MTB it + ∑ industry + ∑ year + µ
The underlying assumption here is that the level of executive compensation is determined by size (SIZE), accounting performance (ROA), stock performance (STOCK RETURN), growth opportunities (MTB) in the respective year, and industry and year fixed effects. This is consistent with recent evidence by Rapp and Wolff (2010) , who find that more than 60% of the variation in the level of executive compensation in Germany is explained by size, year and industry.
AVERAGE PAY is defined as the natural logarithm of average board executive compensation (thousands of euros). Average executive compensation is total executive board compensation divided by the number of board members. SIZE and MTB are defined as stated in the previous section, ROA is the return on assets (i.e., net income plus interest expense divided by average total 9
In addition, we also applied the procedure used by Armstrong et al. (2010) and Joos and Leung (2013) and test whether the coefficient estimates based on the event-date regression differ from coefficient estimates obtained using non-event date returns for both analyses. Our results are similar to those obtained from the second test statistic. 10 Similar approaches are applied by Core et al. (1999) and Ferri and Maber (2013 To assess the sensitivity of executive compensation to firm performance, we need to estimate the relation of the change in executive compensation to the change in shareholder wealth (e.g., Jensen and Murphy, 1990) . Ideally, we would measure the sensitivity of board members' equity portfolios to changes in stock price (see, e.g., Core and Guay (1999) ). However, for the German setting, data on managers' equity portfolios is not available. 12 Instead, as noted, listed firms are mandated to disclose the total amount of compensation, which includes fixed payments, cash bonuses, and components related to long term performance. The latter category includes e.g., bonuses based on horizons of over one year, but also payments from phantom-stocks, and from exercising stock options. Therefore, while we are unable to track managers' equity portfolios, we have available a compensation metric that comprises both short-term bonus payments, and longterm rewards from managerial effort, including equity incentives. Accordingly, we measure pay sensitivity as the percentage change of variable compensation (i.e., cash bonuses, and components related to long term performance) divided by the change in total shareholder return of the respective firm. We use the inverse of this sensitivity metric to ease the interpretation of our results, and arrive 11 Results remain unchanged when restricting the sample for estimating ABNORMAL PAY to the 203 firms included in our final sample. 12 However, Rapp et al. (2011) observe that executive compensation components based on stock performance where only used by 37.4% of firms listed in the Prime Standard.
at our measure PAY INSENSITIVITY. We need to caution that this may be a noisy measure only of the underlying contractual provisions, which we cannot observe. Table 1 summarizes and details all variables used in our empirical analyses.
---Insert Table 1 here ---
Identification of events
To identify events that changed the likelihood or / and the scope and content of regulation, we adopted a two-step approach, (1) Step two of our identification approach was a media analysis. Using the LexisNexis database, and searching 'Handelsblatt', we confirmed that the seven events we chose for our analyses received instant, broad coverage in the national news, in newspapers and online media. We then applied the same keyword search as in step one to scan the two-year period prior to adoption of the VorstAG for media mentioning of critical events relating to the regulation of executive compensation. This analysis yielded no additional events and confirmed our event selection from step one. Panel A of Table 2 reports the dates and nature of these seven events we use for our analyses.
Following event identification, an assessment was performed as to how or whether the relevant events potentially bore down on market perceptions of regulation likelihood and the scope and content of the regulation. While events Nos. 1 (first-time announcement of the regulatory intent) and 7 (adoption of the legal act by the German parliament) significantly increased the likelihood of the regulation, the five events in between mainly altered the expected scope and content of the regulation. For each of these five events, we assessed whether it increased or decreased the expected scope and content of the regulation. Panel B of Table 2 documents this assessment and gives a detailed account of all issues related to management compensation that were discussed over these events. Not untypical for law-making processes, this analysis reveals that following the first proposals by the task force (event 2), the array of proposed measures decreased on the following events (events 3-6).
---Insert Table 2 here ---
Empirical findings
Sample selection and data collection
We examine market reactions for firms listed in the Prime Standard of the Frankfurt stock exchange. We restrict our sample to firms that were consistently listed over the years 2005 to 2009, because we require market data from 2005 onwards to perform our analyses (i.e., the calculation of market adjusted returns, the test variables, and control variables used). This reflects an initial sample of 316 firms that were listed in the Prime Standard from 2005 to 2009. We eliminate 33 foreign firms, since these are not affected by the VorstAG. Also, we exclude preferred shares of 22 firms to avoid double counting, and nine firms that have the legal form of a KGaA (partnership limited by shares), with specific governance structures that limit comparability with the other sample firms. Twelve firms are eliminated due to bankruptcy or mergers. Additional sample reductions result from lack of data and from methodological requirements. 16 firms are eliminated due to missing compensation data, 17 firms because of missing market data, 13 and two firms because financial reports were no longer available. Finally, we exclude one bank (Commerzbank) from our sample because executive compensation was capped to 500,000 euros, as the bank received state support in the wake of the financial crisis, as stipulated under a specific law act ('Finanzmarktstabilisierungsgesetz') in 2008.
14 We obtain a sample of 203 firms (23 financial firms). To preclude that our results are driven by confounding events, we exclude firm observations if the respective firm published its annual or interim report in the respective event window. This leads to 202 observations for our analysis of event one, and 1,353 firm-event observations for the multi-event analysis. Details on the number of firms eliminated on each event can be inferred from Panel A of Table 4 that displays the number of firms examined on each event.
Market price information, balance sheet data, and the data on ownership dispersion is consistent with the definition of the stock exchange, Deutsche Boerse. Data on management compensation data is hand-collected from financial reports. For our main analyses, we use average board compensation metrics, i.e., we divide total compensation (and its three components fixed salary, cash bonus, and long-term incentive pay) by the number of board members. Also, for our robustness checks, we collect the relevant compensation data for CEOs only. 13 To generate reasonable estimates for the industry fixed effects, six of these firms are excluded because they operate in industries with no more than three firms. E.g., Core et al. (1999, p. 377 ) also exclude firms from industries with less than ten firms in order to calculate reasonable estimates for their industry effect variables. 14 Additionally, we exclude another firm (Conergy) that was in financial distress from November 2007 on, requiring substantial amounts of liquidity, followed by accusations of balance sheet fraud in 2009, and accompanied by substantial losses in market value from late 2007 on. Thus, market reactions would not reflect market reactions to the regulation.
Panel A of for SIZE and 2.22 for DAX, which raises no concerns with respect to multicollinearity.
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---Insert Table 3 here ---
Empirical findings
Overall market reactions
Panel A of Table 4 reports the three-day market adjusted returns (MAR) around the events leading to the adoption of the VorstAG. To ease the interpretation of the results, returns are multiplied by negative one for events that decreased the probability or the scope and content of the regulation.
Average market adjusted returns are negative and significantly different from zero only for event
No. 1 (first-time announcement) and for event No. 7 (passage of the VorstAG in the German Parliament), the two most prominent events with respect to the likelihood of the regulation. The aggregate mean market reaction over all seven events is negative, and statistically different from zero, and also statistically different from the simulated mean market adjusted returns from the Monte-Carlo Simulation. In contrast, our third test statistic, the weighted bootstrap p-value, indicates that 28.9% of the average market adjusted returns for seven random non-event windows are lower than the mean event-window return. Taken together, these findings document that on the 15 Descriptive statistics for the first-time announcement (event 1) are reported in Appendix A and descriptive statistics for financial firms are reported in Appendix B. 16 Multicollinearity tests are performed for all explanatory variables in regression model (1) for the pooled sample (N=1,353) without bootstrapping. VIFs for variables other than SIZE and DAX are below 2.00 and mean VIF is 1.39. Thus, inferences are not affected by multicollinearity concerns (e.g., Gujarati, 2003: p. 362 ).
market level, we find no evidence of an aggregate positive reaction of shareholders to the proposed regulation. 17 Thus, our findings contradict H1 that firm value increases with the increased likelihood or scope and content of the regulation of executive compensation by the VorstAG.
To shed further light on the market reactions conditional on the level of executive compensation, we form five portfolios based on quintiles for our test variable ABNORMAL PAY.
The results of this analysis, which is conducted both for the first-time announcement and for the pooled sample, are reported in Panel B of Table 4 . For both samples, we find that market reactions are not significant for the first three portfolios based on all three test statistics. For the fourth portfolio, market reactions are significantly different from zero and from simulated portfolio returns on non-events. For the first-time announcement, the market adjusted return is also significant based on the weighted bootstrap p-value. For the portfolio with presumably highly overpaid executives (portfolio 5), market reactions are significantly negative for all three test statistics. This indicates that market reactions are mainly driven by firms with presumably overpaid executive board members. Also, this finding might explain why we fail to find significant market reactions based on the weighted bootstrap p-value in Panel A. The multivariate analyses in the following sections shed more light on this.
---Insert Table 4 here --- (Zhang, 2007) , and R 2 s ranging from 0.12 to 0.14 (Cai and Walkling, 2011) . Control variables that turn out significant are FREE FLOAT (negative coefficient), MOMENTUM (positive coefficient), and DAX (positive, models (1) and (2)). The latter suggests that large blue-chip firms with high visibility on average experienced more positive market reactions. The negative coefficient on FREE FLOAT indicates that firms with high ownership dispersion react more negatively to the first-time announcement of the regulation Table 6 reports the results from comparing coefficients from model (1) to coefficients obtained from the Monte-Carlo Simulation. Test statistics from comparing the coefficients confirm the results reported in Table 5 . Both test statistics indicate that ABNORMAL PAY is significantly different from its non-event distribution at the 5% and 10% level.
Multivariate analyses
Single-event analysis: First-time announcement of regulatory intent
---Insert
---Insert Table 6 here --- Table 7 reports the results from estimating our three determinants models for the pooled sample of all seven events, using bootstrapped standard errors clustered by event (Cameron et al., 2008) .
Pooled multi-event analysis
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Adjusted R 2 (R 2 ) for the models (1) and (3) is 0.02 (0.03), while adjusted R 2 for model (2) is slightly larger. Again, the explanatory power of our models is in line with the analyses of multiple events in similar studies where adjusted R 2 s range from 0.01 (Joos and Leung, 2013) to 0.17 (Zhang, 2007) . Armstrong et al. (2010) also examine multiple events and report an R 2 of 0.03.
---Insert Table 7 here ---Consistent with the results for the single-event analysis, estimation of model (1) (1) is driven by firms with high levels of 'overpayment', which experience decreases in economic value upon announcement of regulatory intent. In contrast to the single-event analysis, we now also find significant negative coefficients on our variables ABNORMAL PAY and PAY INSENSITIVITY (1% and 5% level, respectively) for the subsample of non-financial firms (model (3)). This leads us to rule out that our main results are primarily driven by financial firms.
Again, the coefficient on FREE FLOAT turns out significantly negative across all models, while the coefficients on MOMENTUM and DAX do not.
Results from the Monte-Carlo Simulation in Table 8 confirm the results from traditional test statistics with respect to ABNORMAL PAY. We find that the coefficient on ABNORMAL PAY from model (1) in Table 7 differs highly and significantly from its non-event distribution.
---Insert Table 8 here ---
Discussion
Our consistent findings of a significantly negative coefficient on our test variable ABNORMAL PAY indicate that 'excess' compensation is negatively associated with market value reactions to an increased likelihood or scope and content of the regulation. This leads to rejecting our second hypothesis that shareholders associate benefits with the regulation for firms which are particularly affected. Moreover, this evidence is consistent with the Larcker et al. (2011) findings for the U.S., which apparently translate to other jurisdictions and governance systems such as Germany.
However, by partitioning our measure of abnormal compensation in model (2), we go beyond , and reveal that market value discounts for firms with 'overpaid' executives are not compensated by market value increases for firms with 'underpaid' executives. Apparently, the negative association of abnormal pay and market returns is driven by firms with presumably overpaid executive board members, which suggests that the regulation imposed costs mainly on firms with an abnormally high level of executive compensation. Shareholders of firms that were explicitly targeted by the regulation expected the regulation to decrease firm value, which suggests that the regulation was not viewed as breaking up inefficient contractual arrangements, but rather the opposite. Although somewhat weaker in terms of significance, the negative coefficient for our variable measuring weak pay-performance sensitivity is consistent with that interpretation, and leads us to reject our third hypothesis. Our subsample analyses for non-financial firms confirm that these effects or market perceptions are not centered on banks only, but appear to represent a general phenomenon.
Taken together, our findings demonstrate an economic impact of the regulation, as reflected in significant market reactions both for the announcement-date analysis, and for the pooled analyses. While the direction of the economic impact, the change in firm value, varies across firms, we are able to document in particular that the negative market reactions for firms with presumably overpaid managers are not compensated by 'winners' of the regulation, as we are unable to demonstrate gains for firms with underpaid executives. Together with our initial finding that the mean market reaction over all events was not positive, we interpret our findings as evidence that market participants overall did not regard the regulation as beneficial. Therefore, we need to reject not only our hypotheses, but also the notion that regulation of executive compensation in the German stakeholder-environment may force contractual arrangement closer to efficient outcomes from a shareholder perspective.
We note that our results are supported by various triangulations. First, we are able to demonstrate our main findings both for the first-time exogenous shock, and for the pooled sample.
Second, we ascertain significance of our results using three different test statistics. However, as noted, we cannot preclude measurement bias for our test variables, in particular for our measure of pay performance insensitivity. Also, we caution that our findings do not allow for ultimate inferences with respect to the potential usefulness of this particular regulation, given the diverse impact on the firm level. Finally, our analysis of economic effects is limited to shareholder wealth, and leaves out other constituencies whose welfare might be affected by the regulation.
Robustness tests
To assess the robustness of our results, we estimate our models employing several variations in the dependent variables and the test variables. With respect to our dependent variable, market adjusted return (MAR), we first use a five-day event window (-2/+2) instead of a three-day window. Results remain basically unchanged, with slight variations in the significance levels. Second, we replace our dependent variable market adjusted returns with cumulative abnormal returns (CAR), also for the three-day event window (e.g., MacKinlay, 1997) . Consistent with our main analyses, we use as a proxy for the market portfolio the FTSE World Europe excluding Germany index. The estimation window comprises 250 trading days prior to the respective events. Again, we find results consistent with our main analyses.
We also use alternative specifications of our explanatory variables. For our measure of excess pay (ABNORMAL PAY), our main analyses use a definition consistent with Cai and Walking (2011) . As a robustness test, we first use an alternative specification similar to and define EXCESS PAY as the two-year average of the natural logarithm of average executive compensation less the median of the firm's size tercile of the respective SIC division. 22 Consistent with our main findings this analysis yields that, although negative, the coefficient for EXCESS PAY is not significant for the single-event analysis, but turns out negative and significant at the 1% level in our pooled multi-event analysis. Second, we modify our definition of ABNORMAL PAY by using the number of employees instead of market capitalization as the proxy variable for SIZE.
We find that results remain basically unchanged, although significance levels decrease to 10% (5%)
for the single-event (pooled) analysis. Third, we estimate model (1) using CEO compensation data instead of average board member compensation. However, we note that this analysis is subject to heavy selection bias. Roughly one out of five listed firms does not report remuneration details for single board members, thereby applying an 'opt-out' clause that law grants to firms a majority of 75 % of shareholder support such non-disclosure. As Hitz and Werner (2012) show, firms that are 22 Larcker et al. (2011) use a substantially larger sample, and subtract from the natural logarithm of CEO compensation the natural logarithm of median annual CEO compensation for all firms in the same industry group and size quintile.
particularly likely to use this opt-out clause are such firms that pay average 'excess compensation, i.e., compensation above the industry average. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that results for the CEO sample are weaker. We find that the coefficient on ABNORMAL CEO PAY is negative and significant for the single-event analysis (10% level) and the coefficient on CEO PAY INSENSITIVITY is negative and significant for the pooled analysis (5% level).
Finally, we use an alternative specification of our second variable, PAY INSENSITIVITY, where we use the percentage change in total average compensation instead of the percentage change in average performance-based compensation. Results remain unchanged, but the significance of the coefficient on PAY INSENSITIVITY increases to the 5% level in the pooled analysis.
Conclusion
This paper exploits a natural experimental setting, the recent regulation of board executive compensation in Germany, to shed light on how the market perceives the impact of the regulation on firm value. We find that market perceptions, reflected in abnormal returns around the announcement of the regulation and the ensuing events that ultimately led to adoption of the regulation, were mildly negative on average. Detailed analyses shed more light on this market reaction and reveal that firms which were more likely to be affected by the regulation experience reductions in equity market value, in particular firms with high 'abnormal' compensation. This indicates that at least for a subset of firms, market participants regarded the proposed regulation as potentially shaking up efficient compensation contracts.
These findings illustrate how the proposed regulation diversely affects different firms, depending on the nature of compensation contracts in place. On a broader level, our results corroborate and expand prior U.S. evidence of a negative impact of comparable regulation, emphasizing how equity market participants across jurisdictions and institutional environments selectively disapprove of regulating management compensation.
Our findings are subject to limitations. First, while most provisions of the VorstAG regulation pertain to listed and private firms, our findings relate to the former only. As governance mechanisms and ownership structures are distinctively different for private firms, our findings on the impact of the regulation are not generalizable to these firms. Second, our measure of economic impact, firm value, reflects shareholders' welfare only. Therefore, we are unable to give a thorough assessment of the usefulness of the regulation with respect to other stakeholders' welfare. Third, our findings are subject to the quality of our empirical constructs. In particular, as we cannot observe existing contracts in place, we need to rely on observable data on management compensation to identify firms with contracts that may provide for abnormally high remuneration, or that may only weakly tie pay to performance.
Overall, this paper's findings underscore how regulation of governance mechanisms potentially affects economic welfare, and that it potentially does so with high variation on the firm level. Moreover, our findings emphasize the need to document and explore economic impacts of regulation in an era of increasing state-intervention. Percentage change of average executive compensation divided by the change in total shareholder return, winsorized at the 1% and 99% level 2 1 MAR and CAR are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to reduce the impact of outliers. 2 Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level to reduce the impact of outliers. Table 1 . T-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, from testing whether coefficients are different from zero. Table 1 . ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. For the bootstrap p-values, ***, ** and * indicate one-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. results from regressing three-day market adjusted returns (-1/+1) around the identified event-dates on proxy variables for the quality of executive compensation and various control variables using industry fixed effects and bootstrapped standard errors (1,000 repetitions) clustered at the event-level. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 1 . Z-values are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively, from testing whether coefficients are different from zero. 7) for the multi-event analysis to mean coefficients obtained from Monte-Carlo Simulation. Simulated coefficients are average coefficients drawn from 1,000 repetitions of randomly selecting seven non-events. P-values are the results from comparing the coefficients from model (1) to the average coefficients from the simulation and are reported in parentheses. Bootstrap p-values are the percentage of coefficients drawn from 1,000 repetitions of randomly selecting seven non-events that are higher (for positive coefficients) or lower (for negative coefficients) than those of the main model. Definitions of variables are reported in Table 1 . ***, ** and * indicate two-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. For the bootstrap p-values, ***, ** and * indicate one-tailed significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
